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ABSTRACT
Despite the recent advances in a wide spectrum of appli-
cations, machine learning models, especially deep neural
networks, have been shown to be vulnerable to adversar-
ial attacks. Attackers add carefully-crafted perturbations
to input, where the perturbations are almost imperceptible
to humans, but can cause models to make wrong predic-
tions. Techniques to protect models against adversarial in-
put are called adversarial defense methods. Although many
approaches have been proposed to study adversarial attacks
and defenses in different scenarios, an intriguing and crucial
challenge remains that how to really understand model vul-
nerability? Inspired by the saying that “if you know your-
self and your enemy, you need not fear the battles”, we may
tackle the aforementioned challenge after interpreting ma-
chine learning models to open the black-boxes. The goal
of model interpretation, or interpretable machine learning,
is to extract human-understandable terms for the working
mechanism of models. Recently, some approaches start in-
corporating interpretation into the exploration of adversar-
ial attacks and defenses. Meanwhile, we also observe that
many existing methods of adversarial attacks and defenses,
although not explicitly claimed, can be understood from the
perspective of interpretation. In this paper, we review re-
cent work on adversarial attacks and defenses, particularly
from the perspective of machine learning interpretation. We
categorize interpretation into two types, feature-level inter-
pretation and model-level interpretation. For each type of
interpretation, we elaborate on how it could be used for ad-
versarial attacks and defenses. We then briefly illustrate ad-
ditional correlations between interpretation and adversaries.
Finally, we discuss the challenges and future directions along
tackling adversary issues with interpretation.
Keywords
Adversarial attack, model robustness, interpretation, ex-
plainability, deep learning
1. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) techniques, especially recent deep
learning models, are progressing rapidly and have been in-
creasingly applied in various applications. Nevertheless, con-
cerns have been posed about the security and reliability is-
sues of ML models. In particular, many deep models are sus-
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Figure 1: Interpretation can either provide directions for
improving model robustness or attacking on its weakness.
ceptible to adversarial attacks [1; 2]. That is, after adding
certain well-designed but human imperceptible perturbation
or transformation to a clean data instance, we are able to
manipulate the prediction of the model. The data instances
after being attacked are called adversarial samples. The
phenomenon is intriguing since clean samples and adver-
sarial samples are usually not distinguishable to a human.
Adversarial samples may be predicted dramatically differ-
ently from clean samples, but the predictions usually do not
make sense to a human.
The model vulnerability to adversarial attacks has been dis-
covered in various applications or under different constraints.
For examples, approaches for crafting adversarial samples
have been proposed in tasks such as classification (e.g., on
image data [3], text data [4], tabular data [5], graph data [6]),
object detection [7], and fraud detection [8]. Adversarial at-
tacks could be initiated under different constraints, such as
assuming limited knowledge of attackers on target models [9;
10], assuming higher generalization level of attack [11; 12],
posing different real-world constraints on attack [13; 14].
Given these progresses, several questions could be posted.
First, are these progresses relatively independent of each
other, or is there a underlying perspective from which we
are able to discover the commonality behind them? Second,
should adversarial samples be seen as the negligent corner
cases that could be fixed by putting patches to models, or
are they deeply rooted to the internal working mechanism
of models that it is not easy get rid of?
Motivated by the idiom that “if you know yourself and your
enemy, you need not fear the battles” from The Art of War,
in this paper, we answer the above questions and review the
recent advances of adversarial attack and defense approaches
from the perspective of interpretable machine learning. The
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relation between model interpretation and model robustness
is illustrated in Figure 1. On one hand, if adversaries know
how the target model work, they may utilize it to find model
weakness and initiate attacks accordingly. On the other
hand, if model developers know how the model works, they
could identify the vulnerability and work on remediation in
advance. Interpretation refers to the human-understandable
information explaining what a model have learned or how a
model makes prediction. Exploration of model interpretabil-
ity has attracted many interests in recent years, because re-
cent machine learning techniques, especially deep learning
models, have been criticized due to lack of transparency.
Some recent work starts to involve interpretability into the
analysis of adversarial robustness. Also, although not being
explicitly specified, in this survey we will show that many
existing adversary-related work can be comprehended from
another perspective as extension of model interpretation.
Before connecting the two domains, we first briefly intro-
duce the subjects of interpretation to be covered in this pa-
per. Interpretability is defined as “the ability to explain
or to present in understandable terms to a human [15]”.
Although a formal definition of interpretation still remains
elusive [15; 16; 17; 18], the overall goal is to obtain and
transform information from models or their behaviors into
a domain that human can make sense of [19]. For a more
structured analysis, we categorize existing work into two cat-
egories: feature-level interpretation and model-level inter-
pretation, as shown in Figure 2. Feature-level interpretation
targets to find the most important features in a data sam-
ple to its prediction. Model-level interpretation explores the
functionality of model components, and their internal states
after being fed with input. This categorization is based on
whether the internal working mechanism of models is in-
volved in interpretation.
Following the above categorization, the overall structure of
this article is organized as below. To begin with, we briefly
introduce different types of adversarial attack and defense
strategies in Section 2. Then, we introduce different cate-
gories of interpretation approaches, and demonstrate in de-
tail how interpretation correlates to the attack and defense
strategies. Specifically, we discuss feature-level interpreta-
tion in Section 3 and model-level interpretation in Section 4.
After that, we extend the discussion to additional relations
between interpretation and adversarial aspects of model in
Section 5. Finally, we discuss some opening challenges for
future work in Section 6.
2. ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
Before understanding how interpretation helps adversarial
attack and defense, we first provide an overview of existing
attack and defense methodologies.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
In this subsection, we introduce different types of threat
models for adversarial attack. The overall threat models
may be categorized under different criteria. Based on dif-
ferent application scenarios, conditions, and adversary ca-
pabilities, specific attack strategies will be deployed.
2.1.1 Untargeted vs Targeted Attack
Based on the goal of attackers, the threat models can be clas-
sified into targeted and untargeted ones. For targeted attack,
it attempts to mislead a model’s prediction to a specific class
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Figure 2: Illustration of Feature-level Interpretation and
Model-level Interpretation for a deep model.
given an instance. Let f denote the target model exposed
to adversarial attack. A clean data instance is x0 ∈ X, and
X is the input space. We consider classification tasks, so
f(x0) = c, c ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}. One way of formulating the task
of targeted attack is as below [2]:
min
x∈X
d(x,x0), s.t. f(x) = c
′ (1)
where c′ 6= c, and d(x,x0) measures the distance between
the two instances. A typical choice of distance measure is
to use lp norms, where d(x,x0) = ‖x− x0‖p. The core idea
is to add small perturbation to the original instance x0 to
make it being classified as c′. However, in some cases, it is
important to increase the confidence of perturbed samples
being misclassified, so the task may also be formulated as:
max
x∈X
fc′(x), s.t. d(x,x0) ≤ δ (2)
where fc′(x) denotes the probability or confidence that x is
classified as c′ by f , and δ is a threshold limiting perturba-
tion magnitude. For untargeted attack, its goal is to prevent
a model from assigning a specific label to an instance. The
objective of untargeted attack could be formulated in a sim-
ilar way as targeted attack, where we just need to change
the constraint as f(x) 6= c in Equation 1, or change the
objective as minx∈X fc(x) in Equation 2.
In some scenarios, the two types of attack above are also
called false positive attack and false negative attack. The
former aims to make models misclassify negative instances as
positive, while the latter tries to mislead models to classify
positive instances as negative. False positive attack and false
negative attack sometimes are also called Type-I attack and
Type-II attack.
2.1.2 One-Shot vs Iterative Attack
According to practical constraints, adversaries may initiate
one-shot or iterative attack to target models. In one-shot
attack, they have only one chance to generate adversarial
samples, while iterative attack could take multiple steps to
explore better direction. Iterative attack can generate more
effective adversarial samples than one-shot attack. How-
ever, it also requires more queries to the target model and
more computation to initiate each attack, which may limit
its application in some computational-intensive tasks.
2.1.3 Data Dependent vs Universal Attack
According to information sources, adversarial attacks could
be data dependent or independent. In data dependent at-
tack, perturbations are customized based on the target in-
stance. For example, in Equation 1, the adversarial sample
x is crafted based on the original instance x0. However, it is
also possible to generate adversarial samples without refer-
ring to the input instance, and it is also named as universal
attack [11; 20]. The problem can be abstracted as looking
for a perturbation vector v so that
f(x+ v) 6= f(x) for “most” x ∈ X. (3)
We may need a number of training samples to obtain v, but
it does not rely on any specific input at test time. Adver-
sarial attack can be implemented efficiently once the vector
v is solved.
2.1.4 Perturbation vs Replacement Attack
Adversarial attacks can also be categorized based on the way
of input distortion. In perturbation attack, input features
are shifted by specific noises so that the input is misclassified
by the model. In this case, let x∗ denote the final adversarial
sample, then it can be obtained via
x∗ = x0 + ∆x, (4)
and usually ‖∆x‖p is small.
In replacement attack, certain parts of input are replace by
adversarial patterns. Replacement attack is more natural
in physical scenarios. For examples, criminals may want to
wear specifically designed glasses to prevent them from being
recognized by computer vision systems 1. Also, surveillance
cameras may fail to detect persons wearing clothes attached
with adversarial patches [13]. Suppose v denote the adver-
sarial pattern, then replacement attack can be represented
by using a mask m ∈ {0, 1}|x0|, so that
x∗ = x0  (1−m) + vm (5)
where the symbol  denotes element-wise multiplication.
2.1.5 White-Box vs Black-Box Attack
In white-box attack, it is assumed that attackers know ev-
erything about the target model, which may include model
architecture, weights, hyper-parameters and even training
data. White-box attack helps discovering intrinsic vulner-
abilities of the target model. It works in ideal cases repre-
senting the worst scenario that defenders have to confront.
Black-box attack assumes that attackers are only accessi-
ble to the model output, just like normal end users. This
is a more practical assumption in real-world scenarios. Al-
though a lot of detailed information about models are oc-
cluded, black-box attack still poses significant threat to ma-
chine learning systems due to the transferability property
of adversarial samples discovered in [10]. In this sense, at-
tacker could build a new model f ′ to approximate the target
1https://www.inovex.de/blog/machine-perception-face-
recognition/
model f , and adversarial samples created on f ′ could still
be effective to f .
2.2 Defenses against Adversarial Attacks
In this subsection, we briefly introduce the basic idea of
different defense strategies against adversaries.
2.2.1 Input Denoising
As adversarial perturbation is a type of human impercepti-
ble noise added to data, then a natural defense solution is
to filter it out, or to use additional random transformation
to offset adversarial noise. It is worth noting that fm could
be added prior to model input layer [21; 22; 23], or as an
internal component inside the target model [24]. Formally,
for the former case, given an instance x∗ which is probably
affected by adversaries, we hope to design a mapping fm,
so that f(fm(x
∗)) = f(x0). For the latter case, the idea is
similar except that f is replace by certain intermediate layer
output h.
2.2.2 Model Robustification
Refining the model to prepare itself against potential threat
from adversaries is another widely applied strategy. The
refinement of model could be achieved from two directions:
changing the training objective, or modifying model struc-
ture. Some examples of the former include adversarial train-
ing [2; 1], and replacing empirical training loss with ro-
bust training loss [25]. The intuition behind is to consider
in advance the threat of adversarial samples during model
training, so that the resultant model gains robustness from
training. Examples of model modification include model dis-
tillation [26], applying layer discretization [27], controlling
neuron activations [28]. Formally, let f ′ denote the robust
model, the goal is to make f ′(x∗)) = f ′(x0) = y.
2.2.3 Adversarial Detection
Different from the previous two strategies where we hope to
discover the true label given an instance, adversarial detec-
tion tries to identify whether the given instance is polluted
by adversarial perturbation. The general idea is to build
another predictor fd, so that fd(x) = 1 if x has been pol-
luted, and otherwise fd(x) = 0. The establishment process
of fd could follow the normal routine of building a binary
classifier [29; 30; 31].
Input denoising and model robustification methods proac-
tively recover the correction prediction from influences of
adversarial attack, by fixing the input data and model ar-
chitectures respectively. Adversarial detection methods re-
actively decide whether the model should make predictions
against the input in order not to be fooled. Implementations
of the proactive strategies are usually more challenging than
the reactive one.
3. FEATURE-LEVEL INTERPRETATION IN
ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
Feature-level interpretation is a widely used post-hoc method
to identify feature importance with respect to a prediction
result. It focuses on the end-to-end relation between in-
put and output, instead of carefully examining the internal
states of models. Some examples include measuring the im-
portance of phrases of sentences in text classification [32],
and pixels in image classification [33]. In this section, we
will discuss how this type of interpretation correlates with
the attack and defense of adversaries, although most work
on adversarial machine learning does not analyze adversaries
from this perspective.
3.1 Feature-Level Interpretation for Under-
standing Adversarial Attack
In this part, we will show that many feature-level interpreta-
tion techniques are closely coupled with existing adversarial
attack methods, thus providing another perspective to un-
derstand adversarial attack.
3.1.1 Gradient-Based Techniques
Following the notations in previous discussion, we let fc(x0)
denote the probability that model f classify the input in-
stance x0 as class c. One of the intuitive ways to under-
stand why such prediction is derived is to attribute pre-
diction fc(x0) to feature dimensions of x0. A fundamental
technique to obtain attribution scores is backpropagation.
According to [34], fc(x0) can be approximated with a linear
function surrounding x0 by computing its first-order Taylor
expansion:
fc(x) ≈ fc(x0) +wTc · (x− x0) (6)
where wc is the gradient of fc with respect to input at x0,
i.e., wc = ∇xfc(x0). From the interpretation perspective,
wc entries of large magnitude correspond to the features
that are important around the current output.
However, another perspective to comprehend the above equa-
tion is that, the interpretation coefficient vector wc also in-
dicates the most effective direction of locally changing the
prediction result by perturbing input away from x0. If we
let ∆x = x− x0 = −wc, we are attacking the model f with
respect to the input-label pair (c,x0). Such perturbation
method is closely related to the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS)
attacking method [1], where:
∆x =  · sign(∇xJ(f,x0, c)), (7)
except that (1) FGS computes the gradient of a certain cost
function J nested outside f , and (2) it applies an additional
sign() operation on gradient for processing images. How-
ever, if we define J with cross entropy loss, and the true
label of x0 is c, then
∇xJ(f,x0, c) = −∇x log fc(x0) = − 1
fc(x0)
∇xfc(x0), (8)
which points to the same perturbation direction as reversing
the interpretation wc. Both gradient-based interpretation
and FGS rely on the assumption that the targeted model
can be locally approximated by linear models.
The traditional FGS method is proposed under the setting of
untargeted attack, where the goal is to impede input from
being correctly classified. For targeted attack, where the
goal is to misguide the model prediction towards a specific
class, a typical way is Box-constrained L-BFGS (L-BFGS-
B) method [2]. Assume c′ is the target label, the problem
of L-BFGS-B is formulated as:
argmin
x∈X
α · d(x,x0) + J(f,x, c′) (9)
where d is considered to control perturbation degree, and
X is the input domain (e.g., [0, 255] for each channel of
image input). The goal of attack is to make f(x) = c′,
while maintaining d(x,x0) to be small. Suppose we apply
gradient descent to solve the problem, and x0 is the starting
point. Similar to the previous discussion, if we define J as
the cross entropy loss, then
−∇xJ(f,x0, c′)) = ∇x log fc′(x0) ∝ wc′ . (10)
On one hand, wc′ locally and linearly interprets fc′(x0), and
it also serves the most effective direction to make x0 towards
being classified as c′.
According to the taxonomy of adversarial attacks, the two
scenarios discussed above can also be categorized into: (1)
one-shot attack, since we only perform interpretation once,
(2) data-dependent attack, since the perturbation direction
is related with x0, (3) white-box attack, since model gradi-
ents are available. Other types of attack could be crafted if
different interpretation strategies are applied, which will be
discussed in later sections.
Improved Gradient-Based Techniques. The interpre-
tation methods based on raw gradients, as discussed above,
are usually unstable and noisy [35; 36]. The possible reasons
include: (1) the target model itself is not stable in terms of
function surface or model establishment; (2) gradients only
consider the local output-input relation so that its scope is
too limited; (3) the prediction mechanism is too complex to
be approximated by a linear substitute. Some approaches
for improving interpretation (i.e., potential adversarial at-
tack) are as below.
• Region-Based Exploration: To reduce random noises
in interpretation, SmoothGrad is proposed in [37], where
the final interpretation wc, as a sensitivity map, is ob-
tained by averaging a number of sensitivity maps of in-
stances sampled around the target instance x0, i.e., wc =∑
x′∈N (x0)
1
|N (x0)|∇fc(x
′). The averaged sensitivity map
will be visually sharpened. A straightforward way to ex-
tend it for adversarial attack is to perturb input by re-
versing the averaged map. Furthermore, [38] designed a
different strategy by adding a step of random perturba-
tion before gradient computation in attack, to jump out
of the non-smooth vicinity of the initial instance. Spatial
averaging is a common technique to stabilize output. For
example, [39] applied it as a defense method to derive
more stable model predictions.
• Path-Based Integration: To improve interpretation,
[40] proposes Integrated Gradient (InteGrad). After set-
ting a baseline point xb, e.g., a black image in object
recognition tasks, the interpretation is defined as:
wc =
(x0 − xb)
D
◦
D∑
d=1
[∇fc](xb + d
D
(x0 − xb)), (11)
which is the weighted sum of gradients along the straight-
line path from x0 to the baseline point x
b. A similar
strategy in adversarial attack is iterative attack [3], where
the sample is iteratively perturbed as:
x′0 = x0, x
′
d+1 = Clipx0,{x′d + α∇xJ(f,x′d, c)}, (12)
which gradually explore the perturbation along a path di-
rected by a series of gradients. Clipx0,(x) denotes element-
wise clipping x so that d(x− x0) ≤ .
Interestingly, although in many cases gradient-based inter-
pretation is intuitive as visualization to show that the model
is functioning well, it may be an illusion since we can easily
transform interpretation into adversarial perturbation.
3.1.2 Distillation-Based Techniques
The interpretation techniques discussed so far require gradi-
ent information ∇xf from models. Meanwhile, it is possible
to extract interpretation without querying a model f more
than f(x). This type of interpretation methods, here named
as distillation-based methods, can be also used for adversar-
ial attack. Since no internal knowledge is required from the
target model, they are usually used for black-box attack.
The main idea of applying distillation for interpretation is to
use an interpretable model g (e.g., a decision tree) to mimic
the behavior of the target deep model f [41; 42]. Once
we obtain g, existing white-box attack methods could be
applied to craft adversarial samples [5]. In addition, given
an instance x0, to guarantee that g more accurately mimics
the nuanced behaviors of f , we could further require that g
locally approximates f around the instance. The objective
is thus as below:
min
g
L(f, g,x0) + α · C(g), (13)
where L denotes the approximation error around x0. For
examples, in LIME [43]:
L(f, g,x0) =
∑
x′∈N (x0)
exp(−d(x0,x′))‖f(x′)− g(x′)‖2,
(14)
and N (x0) denotes the local region around x0. In addi-
tion, LEMNA [44] adopts mixture regression models for g
and fused lasso as regularization C(g). After obtaining g,
we can craft adversarial samples targeting g using attack
methods by removing or reversing the interpretation result.
According to the property of transferability [10], an adver-
sarial sample that successfully fools g is also likely to fool
f . The advantages are two-fold. First, the process is model
agnostic and does not assume availability to gradients. It
could be used for black-box attack or attacking certain types
of models (such as tree-based models) that do not use gra-
dient backpropagation in training. Second, one-shot attacks
on g could be more effective thanks to the smoothness term
C(g) as well as extending the consideration to include the
neighborhood of x0 [45]. Thus, it has the potential to cause
defense methods that are based on obfuscated gradients [46]
to be less robust. The disadvantage is that crafting each
adversarial sample requires high computation cost.
In certain scenarios, it is beneficial to make adversarial pat-
terns understandable to humans as real-world simulation
when identifying model vulnerability. For examples, in au-
tonomous driving, we need to consider physically-possible
patterns that could cause misjudgement of autonomous ve-
hicles [47]. One possible approach is to constrain adversar-
ial instances to fall into the data distribution. For example,
[48] achieves this through an additional regularization term
‖x0 + ∆x − AE(x0 + ∆x)‖, where AE(·) denotes an au-
toencoder. Another strategy is to predefine a dictionary,
and then makes the adversarial perturbation to match one
of the dictionary tokens [47], or a weighted combination of
the tokens [49].
3.2 Feature-level Interpretation against Ad-
versaries
Clean Adversarial
Interpretation
Input 
Instance
Figure 3: The interpretation of an adversarial sample may
differ from the one of a clean sample. Top-left: a normal
example from the shirt class of Fashion-MNIST dataset.
Bottom-left: explanation map for the classification. Top-
right: an adversarial example, originally from the sandal
class, that is misclassified as a shirt. Bottom-right: expla-
nation map for the misclassification.
Feature-level interpretation could be used for defense against
adversaries through adversarial training and detecting model
vulnerability.
3.2.1 Model Robustification with Feature-level
Interpretation
Feature-level interpretation could help adversarial training
to improve model robustness. Adversarial training [1; 3] is
one of the most applied proactive countermeasures to im-
prove the robustness of the model. Its core idea is to first
generate adversarial samples to unveil the weakness of the
model, and then inject the adversarial samples into training
set for data augmentation. The overall loss function can be
formulated as:
min
f
E(x,y)∈D [αJ(f(x), y) + (1− α)J(f(x∗), y)]. (15)
In the scenario of adversarial training, feature-level interpre-
tation helps in preparing adversarial samples x∗, which may
refer to any method discussed in Section 3.1. Although such
an attack-and-then-debugging strategy has been successfully
applied in many traditional cybersecurity scenarios, one key
drawback is that it tends to overfit to the specific approach
that is used to generate x∗. It is untenable and ineffec-
tive [50] to exhaust a number of possible attacking methods
for data preparation. Meanwhile, it is argued that naive
adversarial training may actually perform gradient masking
instead of moving the decision boundary [46; 51].
To train more robust models, some optimization based meth-
ods have been proposed. [25] argued that traditional Empir-
ical Risk Minimization (ERM) fails to yield models that are
robust to adversarial instances, and proposed a min-max
formulation to train robust models:
min
f
E(x,y)∈D [ max
δ∈∆X
J(x+ δ, y)], (16)
where ∆X denotes the set of allowed perturbations. It for-
mally defines adversarially robust classification as a learn-
ing problem to reduce adversarial expected risk. This min-
max formulation provides another perspective on adversarial
training, where the inner task aims to find adversarial sam-
ples, and the outer task retrains model parameters. [38] fur-
ther improves its defense performance by crafting adversar-
ial samples from multiple sources to augment training data.
This strategy is also implicitly supported in [52] which shows
training robust models requires much greater data complex-
ity. [53] further identifies a trade-off between robust classi-
fication error [52; 54] and natural classification error, which
provides a solution to reduce the negative effect on model
accuracy after adversarial training.
Besides adversarial training, feature-level interpretation can
also provide motivation to robust learning. For example,
empirical interpretation results pointed out, that an intrigu-
ing property of CNN is its bias towards texture instead of
shape in making predictions [55]. To tackle this problem,
[56] proposes InfoDrop, a plug-in filtering method to remove
texture-intensive information during forward propagation of
CNN. Feature map regions with low self-information, i.e.,
regions being observed based on their contents contain less
“surprise”, tend to be filtered out. In this way, the model
will pay more attention to regions such as edges and cor-
ners, and be more robust under various scenarios including
adversaries.
3.2.2 Adversarial Detection with Feature-level
Interpretation
In the scenario where a model is subject to adversarial at-
tack, interpretation may serve as a new type of information
for directly detecting adversarial patterns. The motivation
is illustrated in Figure 3. For the adversarial image which
originally shows a shoe, although the model classifies it as
shirt, its interpretation result does not resemble the one ob-
tained from the clean image of a shirt. A straightforward
way to distinguish interpretations is to train another classi-
fier fd as the detector trained with interpretations of both
clean and adversarial instances, paired with labels indicat-
ing whether the sample is clean [57; 58; 59; 60]. Specifically,
[60] directly uses gradient-based saliency map as interpreta-
tion, [59] adopts the distribution of Leave-One-Out (LOO)
attribution scores, while [58] proposes a new interpretation
method based on masks highlighting important regions. [61]
proposes an ensemble framework called X-Ensemble for de-
tecting adversarial samples. X-Ensemble consists of multi-
ple sub-detectors, each of which is a convolutional neural
network to classify whether an instance is adversarial or be-
nign. The input to each sub-detector is the interpretation
on the instance’s prediction. More than one interpretation
methods are deployed so there are multiple sub-detectors. A
random forest model is then used to combine sub-detectors
into a powerful ensemble detector.
In more scenarios, interpretation serves as a diagnosis tool
to qualitatively identify model vulnerability. First, we could
use interpretation to identify whether inputs are affected
by adversarial attack. For example, if interpretation re-
sult shows that unreasonable evidences have been used for
prediction [62], then it is possible that there exists suspi-
cious but imperceptible input pattern. Second, interpreta-
tion may reflect whether a model is susceptible to adver-
sarial attack. Even given a clean input instance, if inter-
pretation of model prediction does not make much sense to
human, then the model is under the risk of being attacked.
For examples, in a social spammer detection system, if the
model regards certain features as important but they are
not strongly correlated with maliciousness, then attackers
could easily manipulate these features without much cost
to fool the system [5]. Also, in image classification, CNN
models have been demonstrated to focus on local textures
instead of object shapes, which could be easily utilized by at-
tackers [55]. An interesting phenomenon in image classifica-
tion is that, after refining a model with adversarial training,
feature-level interpretation results indicate that the refined
model will be less biases towards texture features [63].
Nevertheless, there are several challenges that impede the
intuitions above from being formulated to formal defense
approaches. First, interpretation itself is also fragile in neu-
ral networks. Attackers could control prediction and in-
terpretation simultaneously via indistinguishable perturba-
tion [64; 65]. Second, it is difficult to quantify the robustness
of model through interpretation [35]. Manual inspection of
interpretation helps discover defects in model, but visually
acceptable interpretation does not guarantee model robust-
ness. That is, defects in feature-level interpretation indicate
the presence but not the absence of vulnerability.
4. MODEL-LEVEL INTERPRETATION IN
ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
In this review, model-level interpretation is defined with
two aspects. First, model-level interpretation aims to fig-
ure out what has been learned by intermediate components
in a trained model [66; 34], or what is the meaning of dif-
ferent locations in latent space [67; 68; 69]. Second, given
an input instance, model-level interpretation unveils how
the input is encoded by those components as latent repre-
sentation [67; 68; 22; 24]. In our discussion, the former
does not rely on input instances, while the later is the oppo-
site. Therefore, we name the two aspects as Static Model In-
terpretation and Representation Interpretation respectively
to further distinguish them. Representation interpretation
could rely on static model interpretation.
4.1 Static Model Interpretation for Understand-
ing Adversarial Attack
For deep models, one of the most widely explored strate-
gies is to explore the visual or semantic meaning of each
neuron. A popular strategy for solve this problem is to re-
cover the patterns that activate the neuron of interests at
a specific layer [70; 34]. Following the previous notations,
let h(x) denote the activation of neuron h given input, the
perceived pattern of the neuron can be visualized via solving
the problem below:
argmax
x′
h(x′)− α · C(x′), (17)
where C(·) such as ‖ · ‖1 or ‖ · ‖2 acts as regularization.
Conceptually, the result contains patterns that neuron h is
sensitive to. If we choose h to be fc, then the resultant
x′ illustrates class appearances learned by the target model.
Another discussion about different choices of h, such as neu-
rons, channels, layers, logits and class probabilities, is pro-
vided in [71]. Similarly, we could also formulate another
minimization problem
argmin
x′
h(x′) + α · C(x′), (18)
to produce patterns that prohibit activation of certain model
components or prediction towards certain classes.
+ =
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Figure 4: Example of adversarial attack after applying
model-level interpretation. Upper: Targeted universal per-
turbation. Lower: Universal replacement attack.
The interpretation result x′ is highly related with several
types of adversarial attack, with some examples shown in
Figure 4:
• Targeted-Universal-Perturbation Attack: If we set
h to be class relevant mapping such as fc, then x
′ can be
directly added to target input instance as targeted per-
turbation attack. That is, given a clean input x0, the
adversarial sample x∗ is crafted simply as x∗ = x0 +λ ·x′
to make f(x∗) = c. It belongs to universal attack, be-
cause the interpretation process in Eq.17 does not utilize
any information of the clean input.
• Untargeted-Universal-Perturbation Attack: If we
set h to be the aggregation of a number of middle-level
layer mappings, such as h(x′) =
∑
l log(h
l(x′)) where hl
denotes the feature map tensor at layer l, the resultant x′
is expected to produce spurious activation to confuse the
prediction of CNN models given any input, which implies
f(x0 + λ · x′) 6= f(x0) with high probability [12].
• Universal-Replacement Attack: Adversarial patches,
which completely replace part of input, represent a visu-
ally different attack from perturbation attack. Based on
Eq.17, more parameters such as masks, shape, location
and rotation could be considered in the optimization to
control x′ [72]. The patch is obtained as x′ m, and the
adversarial sample x∗ = x0 (1−m) +x′m, where m
is a binary mask that defines patch shape. Besides, based
on Eq.18, after defining h as the objectness score function
in person detectors [13] or as the logit corresponding to
human class [73], it produces real-world patches attach-
able to human bodies to avoid them being detected by
surveillance camera.
4.2 Representation Interpretation for Initiat-
ing Adversarial Attack
Representation learning plays a crucial role in recent ad-
vances of machine learning, with applications in vision [74],
natural language processing [75] and network analysis [76].
However, the opacity of representation space also becomes
the bottleneck for understanding complex models. A com-
monly used strategy toward understanding representation
is to define a set of explainable basis, and then decompose
representation points along the basis. Formally, let zi ∈ RD
denote a representation vector, and {bk ∈ RD}Kk=1 denote
the basis set, where D denotes the representation dimen-
sion and K is the number of base vectors. Then, through
decomposition
zi =
K∑
k=1
pi,k · bk, (19)
we can explain the meaning of zi through referencing base
vectors whose semantics are known, where pi,k measures the
affiliation degree between instance zi and bk. The work of
providing representation interpretation following this scheme
can be divided into several groups:
• Dimension-wise Interpretation: A straightforward way
to achieve interpretability is to require each dimension to
have a concrete meaning [77; 78], so that the basis can be
seen as non-overlapping one-hot vectors. A natural exten-
sion to this would be to allow several dimensions (i.e., a
segment) to jointly encode one meaning [79; 80].
• Concept-wise Interpretation: A set of high-level and
intuitive concepts could first be defined, so that each bk
encodes one concept. Some examples include visual con-
cepts [68; 67; 81], antonym words [82], and network com-
munities [69].
• Example-wise Interpretation: Each base vector can
be designed to match one data instance [83; 84; 85] or
part of the instance [86]. Those instances are also called
prototypes. For examples, a prototype could be an image
region [86] or a node in networks [85].
The extra knowledge obtained from representation interpre-
tation could be used to guide the direction of adversarial per-
turbation. However, the motivation of this type of work usu-
ally is to initiate more meaningful adversaries and then use
adversarial training to improve model generalization, but
not for the pure purpose of undermining model performance.
For examples, in text mining, [49] restricts perturbation di-
rection of each word embedding to be a linear combination
of vocabulary word embeddings, which improves model per-
formance in text classification with adversarial training. In
network embedding, [87] restricts perturbation of a node’s
embedding towards the embeddings of the node’s neighbors
in the network, which benefits node classification and link
prediction.
4.3 Model-level Interpretation against
Adversaries
Model-level interpretation develops an internal understand-
ing of a model, including its weakness. Defenders could
either choose to improve model robustness or develop a de-
tector using internal data representation.
4.3.1 Model Robustification with Model-level
Interpretation
Some high-level features learned by deep models are not
robust, which is insufficient to train robust models. A novel
algorithm is proposed in [88] to build datasets of robust
features. Let h : X → R denote a transformation function
that maps input to a representation neuron. Each instance
in the robust dataset Dr is constructed from the original
dataset D through solving a optimization problem:
E(x,y)∈Dr [h(x) · y] =
{
E(x,y)∈D[h(x) · y], if h ∈ Hr
0, otherwise
(20)
where Hr denotes the set of features utilized by robust mod-
els. In this way, input information that corresponds to non-
robust representations are suppressed.
Despite not being directly incorporated in the procedure of
model training, inspection of model-level interpretation, es-
pecially latent representation, has motivated several defense
approaches. Through visualizing feature maps of latent rep-
resentation layers, the noise led by adversarial perturbation
can be easily observed [24; 22; 59]. With this observation,
[24] proposes adding denoising blocks between intermediate
layers of deep models, where the core function of the denois-
ing blocks are chosen as low-pass filters. [22] observed that
adversarial perturbation is magnified through feedforward
propagation in deep models, and proposed a U-net model
structure as denoiser. Furthermore, through neuron pattern
visualization, [89] found that convolutional kernels of CNNs
after adversarial training tend to show a more smooth pat-
tern. Based on this observation, they propose to average
each kernel weight with its neighbors in a CNN model, in
order to to improve the adversarial robustness.
4.3.2 Adversarial Detection with Model-level
Interpretation
Instead of training another large model as detector using raw
data, we can also leverage model-level interpretation to de-
tect adversarial instances more efficiently. By regarding neu-
rons as high-level features, readily available interpretation
methods such as SHAP [90] could be applied for feature en-
gineering to build adversarial detector [57]. After inspecting
the role of neurons in prediction, a number of critical neu-
rons could be selected. A steered model could be obtained
by strengthening those critical neurons, while adversarial in-
stances are detected if they are predicted very differently by
the original model and steered model [28]. Nevertheless, the
majority of work on adversarial detection utilizes latent rep-
resentation of instances without inspecting their meanings,
such as directly applying statistical methods on representa-
tions to build detectors [20; 91; 92] or conducting additional
coding steps on activations of neurons [27].
5. ADDITIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
ADVERSARY AND INTERPRETATION
In previous context, we have discussed how interpretation
could be leveraged in adversarial attack and defense. In this
section, we complement this viewpoint by analyzing the role
of adversarial aspect of models in defining and evaluating in-
terpretation. In addition, we specify the distinction between
the two domains.
5.1 Improving Interpretation via Building
Robust Models
In previous content, we have discussed the role of interpre-
tation in studying model robustness. From another perspec-
tive, improving model robustness also influences interpreta-
tion of models. First, the representations learned by robust
models tend to align better with salient data characteristics
and human perception [93]. Therefore, adversarially robust
image classifiers are also useful in more sophisticated tasks
such as generation, super-resolution and translation [94],
even without relying on GAN frameworks. Also, when at-
tacking a robust classifier, resultant adversarial samples tend
to be recognized similarly by the classifier and human [93].
In addition, retraining with adversarial samples [63], or reg-
ularizing gradients to improve model robustness [95], has
been discovered to reduce noises from gradient-based sensi-
tivity maps, and encourage CNN models to focus more on
object shapes in making predictions. To take a step further,
[96] presents the principle of “feature purification”. The
work discovers that dense mixtures of patterns exist in the
weights of models trained with clean data using normal gra-
dient descent. The dense pattern mixtures still generalize
well when being used to predict normal data, but they are
extremely sensitive to small perturbation in input. It then
theoretically proves under two-layer neural networks that,
through adversarial training, dense pattern mixtures could
be removed, as visualized through neuron interpretation.
5.2 Defining Interpretation With Adversaries
Some definitions of interpretation are inspired by adversar-
ial perturbation. For feature-level interpretation, to un-
derstand the importance of a certain feature x, we try to
answer a hypothetical question that “What would happen
to the prediction Y, if x is removed or distorted?”. This
is closely related to causal inference [97; 98], and samples
crafted in this way are also called counterfactual explana-
tions [99]. For example, to understand how different words
in sentences contribute to downstream NLP tasks, we can
erase the target words from input, so that the variation in
output indicates whether the erased information is impor-
tant for prediction [100]. In image processing, salient regions
could be defined as the input parts that most affect the
output value when perturbed [58]. Considering that using
traditional iterative algorithms to generate masks is time-
consuming, Goyal et al. [101] develops trainable masking
models that generate masks in real time. In order to make
the masks sharp and precise, the U-Net architecture [102] is
applied for building the trainable model. Besides, objective
function above can also be reformulated with the informa-
tion bottleneck [103].
Besides defining feature-level interpretation, the similar strat-
egy can be used to define static model interpretation. Es-
sentially we need to answer the question that “How the
model output will change if we change the component in
the model?”. The general idea is to treat the structure of
a deep model as a causal model [104], or extract human
understandable concepts to build a causal model [105], and
then estimate the causal effect of each model component via
causal reasoning. The importance of a component is mea-
sured by computing model output changes after the compo-
nent is removed.
As a natural extension from the discussion above, adversar-
ial perturbation can also be used to evaluate the interpre-
tation result. For examples, after obtaining the important
features, and understanding whether they are positively or
negatively related to the output, we could remove or distort
these features to observe the target model’s performance
change [5; 44]. If the target model’s performance signifi-
cantly drops, then we are likely to have extracted correct
interpretation. However, it is worth noting that the evalua-
tion will not be fair if the metric and interpretation methods
do not match [106].
5.3 Uniqueness of Model Explainability from
Adversaries
Despite the common techniques applied for acquiring in-
terpretation and exploring adversary characteristics, some
aspects of the two directions put radically different require-
ments. For examples, some applications require interpre-
tation to be easily understood by human especially by AI
novices, such as providing more user-friendly interfaces to
visualize and present interpretation [107; 108; 109], while
adversarial attack requires perturbation to be impercepti-
ble to human. Some work tries to adapt interpretation
to fit human cognition habits, such as providing example-
based interpretation [110], criticism mechanism [111] and
counter-factual explanation [112]. Furthermore, generative
models could be applied to create content from interpreta-
tion [113], where interpretation is post-processed into more
understandable content such as dialogue texts. The em-
phasis of understandability in interpretability is exactly op-
posite to one of the objectives in adversarial attack, which
focuses on crafting perturbation that is too subtle to be per-
ceived by human.
6. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE WORK
We briefly introduce the challenges encountered in leverag-
ing interpretation to analyze adversarial robustness of mod-
els. Finally, we discuss the future research directions.
6.1 Model Development with Better
Explainability
Although interpretation could provide important directions
against adversaries, interpretation techniques with better
stability and faithfulness are needed before it could really
be widely used as a reliable tool. As one of the challenges,
it has been shown that many existing interpretation meth-
ods are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [64; 114; 65; 115].
A stable interpretation method, given an input instance and
a target model, should be able to produce relatively consis-
tent result under the situation that input may be subject to
certain noises. As preliminary work, [116] analyzed the phe-
nomenon from a geometric perspective of decision bound-
ary and proposed a smoothed activation function to replace
Relu. [117] proposed a sparsified variant of SmoothGrad [37]
in producing saliency maps that is certifiably robust to ad-
versarial attacks.
Besides post-hoc interpretation, another challenge we are
facing is how to develop intrinsically interpretable models [35].
With intrinsic interpretability, it could be easier for model
developers to correct undesirable properties of models. One
of the challenges is that requiring interpretability may neg-
atively affect model performance. To tackle the problem,
some preliminary work start to explore applying graph-based
models, such as proposing relational inductive biases to fa-
cilitate learning about entities and their relations [118], to-
wards a foundation of interpretable and flexible scheme of
reasoning. Novel neural architectures have also been pro-
posed such as capsule networks [119] and causal models [120].
6.2 Adversarial Attack in Real-World
Scenarios
The most common scenario in existing work considers adver-
sarial noises or patches in image classification or object de-
tection. However, these types of perturbation may not rep-
resent the actual threats in physical world. To solve the chal-
lenge, more realistic adversarial scenarios need to be stud-
ied in different applications. Some preliminary work include
verification code generation 2, and semantically/syntactically
equivalent adversarial text generation [4; 121]. Meanwhile,
model developers need to be consistently alert to new types
of attack that utilizes interpretation as the back door. For
examples, it is possible to build models that predict cor-
rectly on normal data, but make mistakes on input with
certain secret attacker-chosen property [122]. Also, recently
researchers found that it is possible to break data privacy
by reconstructing private data merely from gradients com-
municated between machines [123].
6.3 Improving Models with Adversarial
Samples
The value of adversarial samples goes beyond simply serv-
ing as prewarning of model vulnerability. It is possible that
the vulnerability to adversarial samples reflects some deeper
generalization issues of deep models [124; 125]. Some pre-
liminary work has been conducted to understand the dif-
ference between a robust model and a non-robust one. For
examples, it has been shown that adversarially trained mod-
els possess better interpretability [63] and representations
with higher quality [93; 94]. [126] also tries to connect ad-
versarial robustness with model credibility, where credibility
measures the degree that a model’s reasoning conforms with
human common sense. Another challenging problem is how
to properly use adversarial samples to benefit model perfor-
mance, since many existing work report that training with
adversarial samples will lead to performance degradation es-
pecially on large data [3; 24]. Recently, [127] shows that,
by separately considering the distributions of normal data
and adversarial data with batch normalization, adversarial
training can be used to improve model accuracy.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we review the recent work of adversarial attack
and defense by combining them with the recent advances
of interpretable machine learning. Specifically, we catego-
rize interpretation techniques into feature-level interpreta-
tion and model-level interpretation. Within each category,
we investigated how the interpretation could be used for ini-
tiating adversarial attacks or designing defense approaches.
After that, we briefly discuss other relations between inter-
pretation and adversarial samples or robustness. Finally,
we discuss current challenges of developing transparent and
robust models, as well as potential directions to further uti-
lizing adversarial samples.
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